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SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC 
DETERMINANTS OF RESTATEMENTS 
By Rivka Bennan 
Department of Accounting 
Advisor: Dr. Don W. Finn 
Department of Accounting 
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the economic determinants of 
restatements, focusing on companies that were the object of an 
SEC Enforcement Action. A sample of 30 restatement firms is 
matched with 30 non-restatement firms in the same industry and 
same business and with a similar size as measured by assets. It 
was found that the use of a Big 5 audit firm reduces the incidence 
of restatement. More specifically, use of Ernst & Young as a Big 
5 audit firm significantly reduces the possibility of restatement. 
Variables testing debt to equity ratio, proportion of management 
ownership and proportion of blockholder ownership as 
determinants of restatement were not significant with this 
particular sample. Because of the strong increase in the number 
of restatements in recent years, it is important for a company to 
reduce the potential probability of restatement of its financial 
statements. This can be done through the utilization of a Big 5 
audit firm. 
Introduction: 
When viewing a set of financial statements, many would 
assume that the statements truthfully represent financial results 
for the company and that these results are free from fraudulent 
information. This conclusion is partially due to the fact that 
statements are analyzed by investors, analysts, and competitors 
who use the information contained in financial statements to 
make decisions about the company. In recent years, it appears 
that the assumption of truth may not be completely true,judging 
from accounting scandals that have dominated popular press 
headlines for several years. We have learned from these scandals 
that fmancial statements for many companies contained fraudulent 
information which was used by analysts and investors to make 
judgments about the future profitability of those firms. By the 
time fraudulent information was discovered the information 
backing their decisions was misleading, many investments had 
already lost a substantial portion of their previous value. 
After a portion of the information in financial statements is 
determined to be incorrect, the company must correct the 
information and file a restatement with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Restatements include financial 
statements that were subject to changes in GAAP (such as the 
switch from FIFO to LIFO inventory methods), subsequent 
events (such as stock splits, mergers, and divestures), and true 
fraudulent reporting, in which information is materially 
misrepresented. When fraudulent actions are suspected, the 
SEC often conducts an investigation into the matter and may 
issue an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Action, often 
called an Enforcement Action. This document outlines the 
fraudulent actions, providing background about the company, 
the amount of restatement, and nature of restatement, and any 
future actions taken against the company or its management. In 
essence, an Enforcement Action publicly identifies the company 
that participated in fraudulent wrongdoing. 
This paper investigates the economic determinants of 
restatements. It will focus only on companies who have restated 
earnings and have been the target of an Enforcement Action. 
This will highlight companies that have had fraudulent actions, 
rather than other less serious causes of restatements. To discern 
whether an accounting action is actually an economic determinant 
of restatement, all restatement firms are matched (a control 
group) with an equivalent non-restatement firm. The potential 
economic determinants between restatement and non-restatement 
companies will be measured using the leverage, proportion of 
management ownership, and proportion of blockholder 
ownership. 
After analyzing a sample of 30 restatement companies and 
their matched non-restatement companies, it wa~ determined 
that those firms audited by Big 5 firms were less likely to produce 
a restatement. In a second regression analysis, Ernst & Young 
was found to be the Big 5 firm whose clients were least likely to 
have a restatement. Variables used to test other hypotheses were 
not significant in this test possibly because of the limited sample 
available. 
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The remainder of the paper will be organized as follows. 
Section II discusses relevant background information about the 
occurrence of restatements. Section III reviews previous findings 
of studies that have discussed restatements. Section IV defines 
the sample and data collection methods. Section V discusses 
results of analysis of the relationship between restatement and 
non-restatement companies, and Section VI provides final 
conclusions. 
Background Information: 
To understand the importance of restatements, one high 
profile example is the case ofEnron. When Enron' s restatement 
reduced net income by $569 million forthe years ended December 
3 l, 1999-2000 and the first two quarters of 200 l, the restatement 
was not just a change in numbers for a few accounts (Akhigbe, 
Kudla, & Madura, 2005). It also brought a series of changes that 
have had long lasting effects on overall investor confidence. 
Investors found it difficult to trust the accuracy and reliability of 
other companies when their Enron stock had lost nearly all of its 
value in a period of days. If a fraud as significant as that ofEnron 
could occur within the sight of auditors, then investors may begin 
to wonder about the dependability of information provided by 
other public companies. 
Number of Restatements by Year 
414 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Source: Huron Consulting Group 
The incidence of restatements has become much more 
common since the year 2000, with a 22% increase from 2000-
2004 according to data collected by the Huron Consulting 
Group. The data also shows a 28% increase in restatements 
between 2003 and 2004. Jeff Szafran, managing director of 
Huron Consulting, suggests that this increase might be attributed 
to the "unprecedented level of regulatory and~ audit scrutiny 
d~;en primarily by the Sarbanes-O:dey Act of 2002"' (Bryan: 
Lthen, Rul~d, & Sinnett, 2005). Among its many provisions, 
the ac~ reqmres CEOs and CFOs to certify the accuracy of 
financtal statements, including a certification of internal controls 
estab.li.shes an i~dependent audit committee, and provide~ 
condtu.ons of a~~ttor independence. Szafran also points out the 
followmg condttlons regarding the increase in restatements: 
Public companies spent significant amounts of time 
and money to comply with the requirements of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404, and may have found 
some mistakes in the process. (This section requires 
that management attest to responsibili i y and accuracy 
of internal controls.) 
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) began reviewing the audit practices of the 
major accounting firms. 
The SEC budget jumped to almost twice what it was 
during 2001, and it used that budget to hire more 
professionals to enforce the law. 
The SEC established a new Office of Risk Assessment 
to look into the practices of certain industries. 
Auditors were doing more work, including testing 
companies' internal controls. (Bryan et. al., 2005) 
It is important to also note that the increase in earnings 
restatements has spiked within the last six to eight years and still 
reflects a small percentage of overall filings. A study by the FEI 
Research Foundation reviewed the incidence of earning 
restatements with a sample of 1080 restatements between 1977 
and 2000. It found that the average number of restatements 
between 1977 and 2000 was only 49, with a large spike between 
1998 and 2000 (Moriarty & Livingston, 200 I). More importantly, 
the study found that the average number of restatements since 
1995 represented 0.67% of the average number of reporting 
companies (Morairty & Livingston, 2001). This would suggest 
that, while earnings restatements are significant events in the life 
of a company, the overall quality of financial statements still 
remains high. 
A 2004 General Accounting Office study supports Szafran's 
analysis of conditions that led to an increase in restatements. It 
says about half of companies found their own mistakes, while 
external auditors found 2.5% of mistakes and other external 
parties found 9% of mistakes (Wallace, 2005). Another 4.5% 
were discovered by the SEC, the type of case that will be 
analyzed in this paper (Wallace, 2005). This breakdown shows 
that companies are usually forthcoming when they discover an 
error and may be the best defense against incorrect accounting 
practices. 
The Huron Consulting report also discloses further trends 
in restatements. It found that of the 414 restatements in 2004, 
253 (61%) restated annual reports, which are audited by external 
auditors (Bryan et. al., 2005). They also discovered that almost 
40% of restated annual reports were multiple year restatements, 
signaling "flawed accounting policies" and long-standing errors 
instead of one time errors (Bryan, et. al., 2005). 
Overall, the size and number of restatements appears to be 
increasing even with the negative repercussions experienced by 
the company following a restatement. Most mistakes that cause 
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restatements are found by the company itself and are likely to 
cover multiple years. Even with the overall increase in the 
numbers of restatements, less than I% of companies file a 
restatement in a year, demonstrating the significance of a 
restatement in the life of a company 
Previous Findings: 
The majority of prior literature discusses effects of 
restatements on the stock market. These studies overwhelmingly 
conclude that earnings restatements produced negative stock 
returns. In a sample of firms that restated earnings between 1976 
and 1985, William Kinney and Linda McDaniel found that on 
average stocks earned negative returns between the release of 
false financial statements and the release of the correction 
(Kinney & McDaniel, 1989). The amount of negative return was 
quantified by Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz. They found 
that the mean abnormal return from a sample of 403 restatements 
from 1995-1999 was -9.2% over a two day announcement period 
(Palmrose, Richardson, & Scholz, 2004 ). They further concluded 
that the average stock price change was even larger than -9.2% 
when restatements included an indication of management fraud, 
had large material dollar effects, and were initiated by auditors 
rather than the company itself. 
Anderson and Yohn examined whether different causes of 
a restatement have larger effects on stock price changes. They 
found a larger negative reaction to revenue recognition 
restatements than other type of restatements (Anderson and 
Yohn, 2002). This demonstrates that revenue recognition affects 
investors' view of"firm value and information asymmetries" 
more than other types of restatements (Anderson and Yohn, 
2002). 
Most previous research centered on stock market effects 
from all types of shareholders. Hribar, Jenkins, and Wang, 
however, focused on institutional shareholders. This type of 
shareholder usually represents a blockholder (owns more than 
5% of all shares outstanding), a group that will be examined 
further in this paper. The study provided three key conclusions 
about institutional shareholders. First, transient institutions, 
those focused on the short-term, predict earnings restatements 
one quarter prior to actual restatement, providing evidence that 
they have an information advantage over regular shareholders 
(Hribar, Jenkins, and Wang, 2004). This would be an important 
distinction to draw as this paper examines the relationship 
between blockholders and restatement companies. Next, the 
study found that institutional shareholders respond more 
negatively than other investors to the announcement of a 
restatement, having different interpretations of both the sign and 
weight of the restatement (Hribar et. al., 2004 ). Lastly, institutional 
holders are found to trade earlier than individual investors, who 
usually trade over a five day window around restatements 
(Hribar, et. al., 2004 ). Overall, the results of this study illustrate 
the importance of institutional shareholders to the market as a 
whole because this type of shareholder can have an information 
advantage and is likely to respond sooner and more negatively 
than the typical shareholder. 
Overall, prior research confirms that restatements generally 
cause the stock price of a firm to decline following a restatement. 
usually around 9%. Also, institutional shareholders have 
additional information backing their decisions, allowing them to 
make decisions earlier and more drastically than the~ average 
shareholder. 
Hypothesis Developme11t 
This paper is designed to test for the effect 
of economic determinants of restatements on 
financial statements. To do this, three groups that 
would have interest in seeing the best results for the 
company are examined. These are the debt holders, 
management, and institutional shareholders or 
blockholders. It is expected that each of these 
groups would exercise interest for the company to 
produce the best financial results possible. For 
example, debt holders expect a company to act in 
ways that ensure the future repayment of the debt. 
Management would seek to ensure continued 
employment and maximization of stock-based 
compensation. Blockholders would desire 
maximum returns on investments and would act in 
a manner to accomplish this objective. Hypotheses 
tested are as follows: 
H
3
: There is a positive relationship behveen the debt 
to equity ratio and incidence of restatement. 
H
2
: There is a positive relationship between the 
proportion of management ownership and the 
incidence of restatement. 
H
3
: There is a positive relationship behveen the 
proportion of blockholder ownership and the 
incidence of restatement. 
H., There is a negative relationship between usc of a 
Big 5accounting firm and the incidence of rL>statement. 
Sample and Data Collection: 
The sample used for analysis includes 30 companies that 
were the object of an SEC Enforcement Action regarding financial 
statements for the years 1999-2004. This information was 
obtained from a search of the selected Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases available on the SEC website. Each 
release was analyzed to see that it did include a restatement of 
quarterlyoryearlyfinancialstatements(lO-Qor IO-K). Releases 
were also analyzed to determine the quarter or year in which 
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restatement had the greatest effect on previously stated earnings. 
This period of time was then matched with a control firm that had 
not been the object of an Enforcement Action. Restatement and 
non-restatement companies were matched on three criteria: 1.) 
has the same North American Industrial Classification System 
(NAICS) code; 2.) a similartype of business as discussed in the 
"Business" section of each company's 10-K; 3.) the closest size 
as measured by total assets for the period restated. 
The Compustat North America Industrial Annual and 
Quarterly databases were used to determine the total assets used 
to match companies. The databases were also used to pull the 
short-term debt, long-term debt, and total equity used to compose 
the Debt to Equity ratio used in analysis. 
The proportion of management ownership and the 
proportion of blockholder ownership also used in analysis of 
economic determinants were gathered from the Proxy statements 
available on the SEC website. The Proxy for the period of 
restatement was used to gain this information. If a manager was 
also a blockholder, he or she was included in the management 
percentage and not the blockholderpercentage. The blockholder 
percentage only represents those blockholders that were not 
included in the management percentage. This eliminates 
redundancy among the data collected. 
For usage in the descriptive statistics section, the auditor at 
the period of restatement was also collected from the Proxy 
statement. Also, the Enforcement Releases were analyzed to 
determine common reasons for restatement which are displayed 
in the descriptive statistics. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the sample of 30 restatement firms 
and matches are presented in tables 1-4. Table 1 presents the 
distribution of years represented by the restatements. In this 
sample, an equal number (II) of restatements concerned the 
years 2000 and 200 I. while fewer restatements concerned later 
years. This represents the year affected by the restatement rather 
than the year the restatement was released. Likely, the need for 
r~statements of information in later years has not yet been 
dtscovered or has not yet been the subject of an Enforcement 
Action by the SEC. 
Ta~Ie 2 represents the number of restatements by NAICS 
code ~or tndustry. It shows that nine of the 30 restatements (30%) 
~sed m the study came from the manufacturing industry. This 
mcludes sub-industry names such as engines and turbines 
pharmaceutical preparations. special industry machinery. electri~ 
computers. and prefab metal buildings. Companies include 
Cummins. Inc .. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, DT Industries, 
Inc .. and NCI Building Systems, Inc. Also notable are the six 
restatements from the information industry. This includes Time 
Warner. Inc. from motion picture and video tape production, 
Gemstar-TV Guide International, Inc. from periodicals, and i2 
Technologies, Inc. from prepackaged software. 
Table 3 discloses the reasons for restatements found in the 
Enforcement Action document on the SEC website. 
Overwhelmingly, 12 of the 30 restatements (40%) involved 
improperly recognized revenue. This follows previous findings 
by a study sponsored by the FEI Research Foundation that also 
found the most prevalent reasons for restatement was revenue 
recognition followed by cost issues and loan Joss provisions. In 
the sample used in this paper, cost issues (called improperly 
recorded expenses) and loan Joss provisions (called treatment of 
losses) are also dominant issues. 
Table 4 reviews the auditor responsible for the period of 
restatement for both the restatement firms and non-restatement 
firms. PricewaterhouseCoopers audited an overall majority of 
firms and a majority of the restatement firms also. Also notable, 
Arthur Anderson audited the second most number of firms, as the 
majority of time covered by the sample was before the firm was 
disbanded. Ernst & Young was largely more likely to audit a 
non-restatement firmratherthan a restatement firm, while "other" 
firms were more likely to audit restatement firms. The""other" 
category includes firms that were not in the Big 5, such as 
regional and local firms. Even though these firms were more 
likely to audit a restatement firm rather than a non-restatement 
firm, most restatement firms had been audited by a Big 5 firm. 
Results: 
Univariate Statistics 
Univariate statistics were used to examine the basic variation 
between restatement and matched (control) companies. Although 
these differences alone do not provide evidence to support 
individual hypotheses, they do provide insight into the sample 
used in this paper 
Table 5 presents the overall mean of variables from all 
causes of restatements and their matched companies. In this 
sample of30 restatement companies and 30 matched companies, 
matched companies exhibited a higher asset to equity ratio, 
shown as 7.86 for matched companies and 4.46 for restatement 
companies. This illustrates that companies experiencing a 
restatement hold a lower amount of assets in relation to their 
equity, providing a possible explanation of their behavior. Also 
notable, restatement companies have a 2.6% higher percentage 
of blockholder ownership than matched companies. This may 
show that because restatement companies have ahigherproportion 
of stock owned by these institutional shareholders, they may also 
be susceptible to the pressures from these blockholders. Such a 
type of owner would be more demanding than an individual 
stockholder because of the concentrated n;ture of ownership. 
Table 6 presents the mean of only the two most common 
causes of restatement as previously discussed - improperly 
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recognized revenue and improperly recorded expenses. Of the 
firms that have improperly recognized revenue, restatement 
companies have a higher asset to equity ratio than matched 
companies. The mean of 2.24 for restatement firms is much 
lower than the mean of 4.46 from all causes of restatement. Also, 
assets to equity is higher for matched companies than restatement 
companies when reviewing the overall mean. Companies with 
improperly recognized revenues have a considerably higher 
percentage of blockholder ownership, representing the same 
situation as the overall mean of all restatements. 
This ownership situation is negative when examining only 
the means of restatement firms and matched firms for improperly 
recorded expenses. For this situation, matched firms have a 
higher proportion of blockholder ownership than restatement 
firms. Restatement firms also have higher assets to equity, 
current debt to equity, long term debt to equity, and total debt to 
equity than matched companies. With the possible exception of 
assets to equity, this would follow conventional knowledge that 
the pressures of holding debt could lead to possible areas of 
fraud, therefore restatements 
Regression Analysis 
The hypotheses were tested using two different regression 
models. In each model, restatement versus matched firms was 
used as the dependent variable, using a dichotomous indicator 
variable of 1 to indicate a restatement firm or 0 to indicate a 
matched firm. Other objective variables, such as Big 5 audit firm 
in Modell and individual Big 5 firm or smaller SEC audit firms 
in Model2, respectively, were measured by using a 1 to signify 
use of the particular firm and a 0 to signify use of another firm. 
Also, the Log of assets was used to eliminate any size bias 
between firms with different levels of assets. 
The models are as follows: 
Model 1 
Restatement= a+ b1(assets) + b2 (debt/assets)+ b3 (debt/ equity)+ b 4 (%of management ownership)+ b5 (% ofblockholder ownership)+ b6 (Big 5 audit firm) 
Model2 
Restatement= a+ b1(assets) + b2 (debt/assets)+ b, (debt/ equity)+ b 4 (%of management ownership)+ b5 (%of blockholder ownership)+ b6 (EY) + b7 (Arthur 
Anderson)+ b8 (Deloitte) + b9 (KPMG) + b10 (PWC) 
Table 7 illustrates the mean, median, standard deviation. 
high and low values for each of the variables used in each modeL 
It indicates the wide variation between the high and low values 
for the particular variable and gives a relative idea of the 
midpoint of the variable. 
Table 8 presents the results of regression tests performed 
using the two models presented above. Model 1 shows that the 
intercept and Big 5 audit firm results are significant at a 10% 
level. The p-value of the Big 5 audit firm variable can be divided 
in half to represent a one tailed test rather than a two tailed test. 
This is applicable because the influence of an audit firm is 
hypothesized to be positively related to fewer restatements, and 
thus it is a one-tailed test.. In this case, it is that firms who use 
a Big 5 audit firm would experience fewer restatements, as large 
audit firms have been shown in previous studies to produce 
higher quality audit results. In their I 999 paper, Colbert and 
Murray present several reasons why major audit firms would 
produce a higher quality audit. These include taking advantage 
of economies of scale, guarding reputation, and utilization of 
human capital (Colbert and Murray, 1999). 
The Big 5 audit firm variable is also significant because of 
its representation of the overall population of public companies. 
Firms who used an auditor other than a Big 5 firm received a "0" 
value for the Big 5 variable, and the proportion of firms using a 
non-Big 5 firm (I 0%) reflects the actual proportion of public 
firms using non-Big 5 audit firms. 
The regression of Model2 is also presented in Table 8. The 
intercept and Ernst & Young both produced significant results. 
At a 10% level in a one tailed test, firms audited by Ernst & 
Young are less likely (negative coefficient of -0.50) to audit a 
company that restated financial statements. This would follow 
the regression analysis of Modell that found companies audited 
by a Big 5 firm are less likely to produce a restatement. 
The lack of overall significance in both models may be 
attributed to the small sample size. It is possible that with a larger 
sample size, results would be significant. However, an 
examination of the coefficients (although not significant) may 
provide some additional insight relative to the overall research 
question- what are the factors that contribute to restatements? 
There is anecdotal information from the coefficients that 
may help one to interpret how managers might engage in 
mistatements of financial information. The most important 
variables are the percentage of management and blockholder 
ownership. In both models, negative coefficient of management 
ownership indicates that with increased percentages of 
management ownership, the probablity of restatement decreases. 
A possible explanation of this is that management would likely 
want to avoid restatement to protect the value of its ownership in 
the company. A similar logical argument exists with the 
percentage ofblockholders. Both regression models show that 
increased blockholder ownership is positively related with the 
probability of restatement. It is expected that blockholders 
demand high returns and because of their concentration of 
ownership, they would have more power than the average 
shareholder. The debt to assets ratio is also useful. With a 
positive coefficent of 0.1 and 0.11 in Model I and Model 2, 
respectively, it shows that with an increase in the debt to assets 
ratio, the probability of restatement increases. This is logical 
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because as debt increases, companies face increased pressure to 
produce positive financial performance to maintain credit and 
market standing. The pressure may cause the company to follow 
questionable accounting practices that could eventually lead to 
a restatement when policies are found to be incorrect. This is 
evidenced by positive coefficients of the debt to assets ratio. The 
results of assets and debt to equity ratio variables, coefficients 
of 0.02 and -0.01, respectively, produce a negligible impact on 
the results of both models, minimizing their importance. 
Conclusion: 
Following the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, 
the frequency of financial statement restatements has increased 
because of the increased scrutiny on company internal control 
practices. Previous literature has discussed the effects of 
restatements on both the company and investors. It was found 
that a company is likely to experience a decreased stock price 
while investors may suffer from a loss in value of their investment. 
This paper seeks to find the economic determinants of 
restatements using a sample of 30 restatement firms derived 
from companies that have received SEC Enforcement Actions. 
These firms were matched by industry and asset size with 30 
firms that had not restated financial statements. The sample was 
tested using four hypotheses covering the areas of debt to equity 
ratio, proportion of management ownership, proportion of 
blockholder ownership, and the use of a Big 5 accounting firm 
for auditing. 
It was concluded that a negative relationship exists between 
audit by a Big 5 accounting firm and the incidence of restatement. 
Further. the use of Ernst & Young as an audit firm significantly 
decreased the incidence of restatement in this sample. Results 
for other hypotheses were not significant for this sample, possibly 
due to the small sample size. 
The results were consistent with previous studies that 
found Big 5 firms, such as Ernst & Young, provided higher 
quality audits than non Big 5 firms. Also, although not significant, 
the negative coefficient of management ownership and the 
positive relationship of blockholder ownership also provide 
useful information. These groups both act in their own self 
interest- that of protecting the value of investments and earning 
higher returns, respectively. Further, the positive coefficient of 
the debt to assets ratio highlights the pressures that debt can 
cause for a company. 
As Sarbanes Oxley proviSIOns continue to be fully 
implemented. incidence of restatements will probably continue 
to remain higher than that of previous years. This will continue 
to affect both investors and the company itself, as restatements 
can be the catalyst for a further sequence of effects, such as stock 
price changes. credit rating revisions, and monetary fines. 
Research from this paper shows that the use of audit services 
from a Big 5 firm can mitigate these effects. 
Supplemental Tables: 
Table 1: Years Represented 
by Restatements 
1999 5 
2000 11 
2001 11 
2002 2 
2003 0 
2004 1 
N 30 
Table2: 
Industry 
Utilities (22) 1 
Construction (23) 1 
Manufacturing (31-33) 9 
Retail trade (44-45) 3 
lnfonnation (51) 6 
Finance and Insurance (52) 5 
Real estate and rental and leasing {53) 2 
Professional, scientific, and technical services {54) 3 
--"30 
Table 3: 
Reason for Restatement 
Improperly recognized re\enue 12 
Improperly recorded expenses 7 
Treatment of losses 4 
Accounts receivable/payable 3 
Improperly recorded gain on sale 2 
Other 2 
N 30 
Table4: 
Auditor 
Restatement 
co. % Match co. % Total % 
PWC 8 26.7% 7 23.3% 15 25.0% 
Arthur Anderson 6 20.0% 7 23.3% 13 21.7% 
EY 4 13.3% 7 23.3% 11 18.3% 
KPMG 5 16.7% 3 10.0% 8 13.3% 
Deloitte 3 10.0% 4 133% 7 11.7% 
Other 4 13.3% 2 6.7% 6 10.0% 
N 30 30 60 
Source: Roxy slaterrent for peroo of restate<rent 
Table 5: 
Overall Mean of All Causes of Restatement 
Assets to equity ratio 
Current debt to equity ratio 
Long term debt to equity ratio 
Total debt to equity ratio 
% of management ownership 
% of b!ockholder ownership 
Restatement 
4.46 
0.26 
1.22 
1.48 
17.2% 
17.2% 
Matched Companies 
7.86 
0.58 
3.02 
3.61 
19.5% 
14.6% 
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Table 6: 
Mean of Most Common Causes of Restatement 
Improperly 
Recognized Improperly Recorded 
Revenue Exeenses 
Restatement Match Restaterrent Match 
Assets to equity ratio 2.24 2.02 7.09 3.25 
Current debt to equity ratio 0.05 0.04 0.29 0.16 
Long term debt to equity ratio 0.48 0.67 2.99 0.33 
Total debt to equity ratio 0.53 0.70 3.29 0.49 
% of management ownership 12.9% 16.3% 21.4% 41.0% 
% of block holder ownership 19.1% 4.5% 171% 23.1% 
Table 7: 
Model 1 
Varloble Mean Median Std Dev High Low 
log Assets 3 3 1.16 6 1 
Debt! Assets 0.33 0.18 0.40 2.06 0.00 
DebUEquity 2.55 0.72 9.46 72.19 0.00 
% management ownership 18.37% 9.77% 23.21% 100.00% 0.00% 
% block holder O'Nnership 15.90% 10.85% 18.88% 99.50% O.OOOA. 
Big 5 audit finn 1 1 0 1 0 
Model 2 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev High Low 
log Assets 3 3 1.07 5 
Debt! Assets 0.33 0.18 0.40 2.06 0.00 
Debt!Equity 2.55 0.72 9.46 72.19 0.00 
% management ownership 18.37% 9.77% 23.21% 100.00% 0.00% 
% blockholder ownership 15.90% 10.85% 18.88% 99.50% 0.00% 
EY 0 0 0.39 0 
Mhur Anderson 0 0 0.42 0 
Deloitte 0 0 0.32 0 
KPMG 0 0 0.34 0 
PWC 0 0 0.44 0 
Table 8: 
Regression Results 
Coefficient P value 
Model 1 
Intercept 0.74 0.03 
Log Assets 0.02 0.75 
Debt/Assets 0.1 0.57 
Debt/Equity -0.01 0.19 
% management ownership -0.16 0.61 
% blockholder ownership 0.2 0.59 
Big 5 audit firm -0.36 0.17 
Number of obser.ations 60 
Mode/2 
Intercept 0.75 0.03 
Log Assets 0.02 0.81 
DebUAssets 0.11 0.54 
Debt/Equity -0.01 0.17 
% management ownership -0.2 0.54 
% blockholder ownership 0.22 0.56 
EY -0.5 0.11 
Arthur Anderson -0.39 0.19 
Deloitte -0.4 0.22 
KPMG -0.19 0.55 
PWC 0.31 0.29 
Number of observaticns 60 
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Faculty comments: 
Dr. Don Finn explains the importance of his student's work 
in his letter of support for its publication. He said, 
Ms. Berman's paper investigates the economic 
determinants of financial restatements that have been 
mandated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEQ). Briefly, the SEC mandates that financial 
statements be restated when they find anomalies 
and/or errors (and possibly fraud) in the published 
information. The paper focused only on companies 
who have restated earnings and have been the target 
of an Enforcement Action. 1l1e purpose of identifying 
thesecompaniesisbecausetheymayhaveexperienced 
fraudulentactions,ratherthanotherlessseriouscauses 
of restatements. To discern whether an accounting 
action is actually an economic determinant of 
restatement, all restatement firms were matched (a 
control group) with an equivalent non-restatement 
firm. The potential economic determinants between 
restatement and non-restatement companies were 
measured using the leverage, proportion of 
management ownership, and proportion of 
blockholder ownership. 
It was determined that those firms audited by Big 5 
firms were less likely to produce a restatement. In a 
second regression analysis, Ernst & Young was found 
to be the Big 5 firm whose clients were least likely to 
have a restatement. Thus, it was determined that 
large public accounting firms who performed audits 
were more reliable than those firms which are smaller 
and may not have the resources to properly audit 
large public companies. 
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